Author: Steven G. Jones
On Friday, June 28, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a long-anticipated decision in the combined cases of Loper Bright v. Raimondo and Relentless v. Commerce,[1] overturning 40 years of precedent requiring federal courts to defer to decisions of administrative agencies in the interpretation and application of regulations, as required by the Court’s prior decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Resources Defense Council, Inc. (“Chevron”).[2] The Court’s decision now requires that lower federal courts must exercise independent judgment when reviewing agency acted actions, rather than deferring to the agency’s interpretation when the law is ambiguous. The decision constitutes a watershed, with Justice Roberts’ stating in the 6-3 majority opinion[3] that
agency interpretations of statutes—like agency interpretations of the Constitution—are not entitled to deference … questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis. … Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their independent judgment in decided whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority as the [Administrative Procedures Act] requires.” (Italics in original).[4]
The Loper opinion was issued in two companion cases in which fishing groups challenged the National Marine Fisheries Service’s rule requiring fishers to pay the cost of having federal compliance monitors aboard their ships.[5] In reviewing challenges to the rule, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the government, finding that ambiguities in the underlying statute demanded deference to NMFS’ interpretation and application of its own rules, as required by Chevron.[6] The same result occurred in Relentless, where the District Court deferred to NMFS and the First Circuit affirmed that decision, both courts relying on Chevron.[7] The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the two cases specifically to determine “whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified.”[8]
Even while reversing the lower court’s decisions, the Supreme Court acknowledged that, while an agency’s interpretation of a statute “cannot bind a court,” it may inform the court’s interpretation “to the extent it rests on factual premises within [the agency’s] expertise,” which may give it the “power to persuade if lacking power to control.”[9] However, the opinion was clear that the prior approach dictated by Chevron was misguided and was therefore being rejected: “the reviewing court—not the agency whose action it reviews—is to ‘decide all relevant questions of law and interpret … statutory provisions.’”[10]
Justice Kagan filed a strong dissent, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson Brown joined,[11] asserting that “the majority disdains restraint, and grasps for power. … A rule of judicial humility gives way to a rule of judicial hubris. … As if it did not have enough on its plate, the majority turns itself into the country’s administrative czar.”[12]
The decision will have implications for both the judicial branch and federal administrative agencies and will likely spur Congress to legislate with greater specificity—at least where it delegates authority to administrative agencies to interpret and administer statutes. Challenges to administrative rules by regulated entities will inevitably increase, particularly with respect to environmental regulations, even in instances where the rules are based on scientific and technical expertise, and the likelihood of success in those challenges will be higher. It is likely that these challenges may upset rules thought to be long settled, at least in the short-term.
A copy of the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in Loper can be found at this link.
If you would like more information on the Loper decision in particular or administrative law in general, you can contact any member of Ray Quinney & Nebeker’s Environmental and Natural Resources practice group.
Steven G. Jones
Steve Jones is Chair of the Environmental and Natural Resources Section. He has extensive experience handling a wide variety of environmental matters in both the litigation and transactional arenas. Mr. Jones has litigated cases under every major environmental statute, including CERCLA, RCRA, the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, and acted as lead defense counsel in both citizen suits and environmental enforcement actions brought by state and federal agencies. He has extensive experience in obtaining state and federal permits for projects, acting on behalf of both public and private clients, as well as defending those permits once they have been obtained. He also has broad experience in insurance coverage issues, acting on behalf of insureds.
[1] U.S. Supreme Court Case Nos. 22–451, 45 F.4th 359 (D.C. Cir. 2022), and Relentless, Inc. et al. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 22-1219, 62 F.4th 621 (1st Cir. 2023). While she joined in the dissent, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson recused herself from considering Loper Bright, based on her involvement in the matter while a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
[2] 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
[3] Justice Gorsuch and Justice Thomas both filed concurring opinions.
[4] Loper, __ S.Ct. __, 2024 WL 3208360 (June 28, 2024) at ** 12, 13, 22. All citations to the opinion are to the version of the opinion appearing on Westlaw.
[5] Id. at ** 6-8.
[6] Loper, 544 F. Supp.3d 82, 107 (D.D.C. 2021), aff’d, 45 F.4th 359, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
[7] Relentless, 561 F. Supp.3d 226, 234-238 (D.R.I. 2021), aff’d, 62 F.4th 621, 628 (1st Cir. 2022).
[8] Loper, 2024 WL 3208360 at * 8.
[9] Id. at * 17 (quoting Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983), and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 135, 140 (1944)).
[10] Loper, 2024 WL 3208360 at * 16 (quoting the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706) (italics in original opinion).
[11] Justice Jackson Brown’s joinder in the dissent was limited solely to the Relentless decision.
[12] Loper, Kagan, J. (dissenting), 2024 WL 3208360 at * 40.
